Vibrations from the north
http://inside.org.au/vibrations-from-the-north/
(...)
Differences at sea were much more serious. In January 1974, the Chinese navy attacked and quickly defeated units of the US-supported Republic of Vietnam based on the Paracel Island group, 300 kilometres southeast of Hainan Island. Although Hanoi was deeply embarrassed by China’s occupation of the Paracels, it could not protest given its dependence on Beijing to defeat the South Vietnamese forces. Beijing then declared sovereignty over the entire continental shelf in the South China Sea, which brought it into prospective conflict not only with Vietnam but also with the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In 1988, Chinese forces sank several Vietnamese naval vessels in the Spratly Archipelago and occupied six islands.
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At first China chose only to challenge Vietnam-sponsored explorations in the Bay of Tonkin waters between Hainan Island and the north central Vietnamese coast. Beijing and Hanoi agreed to draw a line halfway for purposes of awarding exploration contracts, not territorial demarcation. More recently, however, China has started to challenge all Vietnamese oil-related operations on the continental shelf. Beijing’s most effective tactic is to warn foreign companies away from signing contracts with Vietnamese partners. In March of this year, BP withdrew from explorations only eighty kilometres off Vietnam’s south central coastline. In July, Chinese envoys warned Exxon Mobil, the world’s largest oil firm, that its future mainland business could be jeopardised unless it pulled out of deals with Vietnam.
Early this year, China also dispatched armed patrol vessels with orders to regulate all fishing in the South China Sea down to the twelfth degree latitude. In May, scores of Vietnamese fishing boats were stopped, crews detained, and vessels impounded. Vietnamese websites compared Chinese behaviour with the Somali pirates. Vietnam’s protests to Beijing had little effect, however. Hanoi lacks sufficient patrol vessels to consider protecting fishermen within Vietnam’s 200 nautical mile offshore economic zone, much less beyond.
(...)
In the past there have been calls for an international or multilateral conference to deliberate the future of the South China Sea. If such a conference were to occur, Vietnam might abandon its claims to the Paracels in exchange for recognition of the portion of the Spratlys it currently occupies. China has opposed any internationalisation of the issue, however, and shows no signs of budging from its continental shelf claims. For Hanoi to accept Chinese sovereignty over the continental shelf would mean having its entire coastline boxed in and losing all offshore oil rights.
(...)
http://inside.org.au/vibrations-from-the-north/
(...)
Differences at sea were much more serious. In January 1974, the Chinese navy attacked and quickly defeated units of the US-supported Republic of Vietnam based on the Paracel Island group, 300 kilometres southeast of Hainan Island. Although Hanoi was deeply embarrassed by China’s occupation of the Paracels, it could not protest given its dependence on Beijing to defeat the South Vietnamese forces. Beijing then declared sovereignty over the entire continental shelf in the South China Sea, which brought it into prospective conflict not only with Vietnam but also with the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In 1988, Chinese forces sank several Vietnamese naval vessels in the Spratly Archipelago and occupied six islands.
(...)
At first China chose only to challenge Vietnam-sponsored explorations in the Bay of Tonkin waters between Hainan Island and the north central Vietnamese coast. Beijing and Hanoi agreed to draw a line halfway for purposes of awarding exploration contracts, not territorial demarcation. More recently, however, China has started to challenge all Vietnamese oil-related operations on the continental shelf. Beijing’s most effective tactic is to warn foreign companies away from signing contracts with Vietnamese partners. In March of this year, BP withdrew from explorations only eighty kilometres off Vietnam’s south central coastline. In July, Chinese envoys warned Exxon Mobil, the world’s largest oil firm, that its future mainland business could be jeopardised unless it pulled out of deals with Vietnam.
Early this year, China also dispatched armed patrol vessels with orders to regulate all fishing in the South China Sea down to the twelfth degree latitude. In May, scores of Vietnamese fishing boats were stopped, crews detained, and vessels impounded. Vietnamese websites compared Chinese behaviour with the Somali pirates. Vietnam’s protests to Beijing had little effect, however. Hanoi lacks sufficient patrol vessels to consider protecting fishermen within Vietnam’s 200 nautical mile offshore economic zone, much less beyond.
(...)
In the past there have been calls for an international or multilateral conference to deliberate the future of the South China Sea. If such a conference were to occur, Vietnam might abandon its claims to the Paracels in exchange for recognition of the portion of the Spratlys it currently occupies. China has opposed any internationalisation of the issue, however, and shows no signs of budging from its continental shelf claims. For Hanoi to accept Chinese sovereignty over the continental shelf would mean having its entire coastline boxed in and losing all offshore oil rights.
(...)
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